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Abstract
I examine a model of long-term contracting in which the buyer is privately
informed about the discrete probability distribution for his future value for a
divisible product, and fully characterize the optimal long term contract that
will be offered by a monopolistic seller in a simple case where two types of
buyers can have two types of utility in any period. In such a case, the buyer
more likely to have a high utility type will receive the first-best allocations in-
different of his value report, while the lower type will receive the first best only
if he makes a high utility report. The paper also supplements the current liter-
ature on infinite dynamic games with continuous buyer types, which relies on
the use of a distribution of types with full support and an envelope theorem.
With discrete types, the number of compatibility constraints considered can be
greatly reduced by sandwiching the border of the space of solutions allowed
by constraints: formulate the maximization problem in a wider space with
fewer constraints and prove that the solution obeys a simpler set of stronger
constraints that places it in the allowed region.
Keywords: asymmetric information, dynamic contracting, mechanism de-
sign, information structure.
JEL Classification: C73, D82.
1 Introduction and Related Literature
The relationships between buyers and sellers are often dynamic in nature, and the
relevant private information will rarely stay hidden when there is repeated inter-
action. This has important implications for the pricing of products or the transfer
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of goods between a principal and an agent, since the inefficiency induced by asym-
metric information may be reduced by considering the long term behavior of the
agent.
There are many ways to model repeated interactions between a principal and
an agent, say a seller and a buyer, and by the revelation principle the optimal
mechanism will involve the buyer reporting his private information, as long as
adequate incentive compatibility and rationality conditions are satisfied. Because
of truthful reporting, if the private information known when the contract is signed
is the only thing that has a bearing on future private information the problem can
be seen intuitively in a greatly simplified way. The dynamic contract resembles a
string of static ones, contingent on the time period, agent type and period specific
reports.
An early contribution in the literature on dynamic mechanisms with adverse
selection is the work of Baron and Besanko [1984], who describe a monopoly able
to commit, dealing with an agent of variable type, in two periods. Dynamic set-
tings with constant types are considered in Dewatripont [1989], Hart and Tirole
[1988], and Laffont and Tirole [1988, 1990]. Cremer and McLean [1988] justifies
the usual assumption of independent information across agent types to prevent
full rent extraction. Laffont and Tirole [1990] introduce a standard framework, an-
alyze the two-period renegotiation proof contract, and Laffont and Tirole [1996]
introduce variable agent types and commitment in the context of regulation. More
dynamic models in which types are stochastically determined are studied by Rus-
tichini and Wolinsky [1995], and Courty and Li [2000]. In more recent contribu-
tions, Battaglini [2005] studies variable stochastic types in infinite time with com-
mitment, and Battaglini [2007] analyzes limited commitment with stochastic types.
Eso˝ and Szentes [2007] consider many agents in two time periods, when the prin-
cipal can also release private information. Bergemann and Välimäki [2010] and
Athey and Segal [2013] introduce dynamic generalizations of the classic Vickery-
Clarke-Groves incentive compatible and efficient mechanism, Boleslavsky and Said
[2013] study an infinite period dynamic interaction with persistent shocks and con-
tinuous types, while Pavan et al. [2014a] work on the general mechanism design
problem with continuous types.
From an application perspective, it is interesting to consider that there is a link
between the private information at different times, and this link can be stochastic –
given by a probabilistic evolution; statistic – given by an underlining condition like
an initial probability distribution; or in general a combination. In Battaglini [2005],
we see the simplest form of a stochastic link: the utility type evolves according to
a Markov process. It is simplest in the sense that the information is linked only
between consecutive periods, and the preceding periods to the last are irrelevant.
By contrast, this paper considers a statistic link: the utility types are given by a
distribution depending on a buyer type.
This paper presents the interaction between a buyer and a seller, when the
buyer has private information about his periodic utility type, and his long run buyer
type. The buyer type will be informative of the utility type in terms of probabilities,
and all buyer types will draw from the same discrete set of utility types. The buyer
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type is private information and will influence the type of contract that is optimally
offered only to him. A general model for the interaction between a seller and a
buyer with one of a discrete set of types is developed. General results allowing
for the simplification of the problem are obtained, based on the idea of generating
a restricted set of constraints and finding a candidate mechanism in the larger pa-
rameter space restricted by that subset, and then verifying that a sufficiently strong
set of constraints also hold. The results are applied to derive expressions for op-
timal allocations in a setting in which each period the buyer can have one of two
possible utility types, a low type and a high type, which can change over time. The
utility types are selected according to a distribution which can also change, with
the condition that the high buyer type is more likely to have the higher utility type
each period. The analysis shows that there is separation between buyer types: for
the two types, two contracts are offered, and for each of these contracts, reporting
different utility types in a period leads to different allocations in that period. In a
typical way, allocations for unprofitable low buyer types have to be reduced, to re-
duce the information rent paid to the profitable high types. Therefore, allocations
are optimal following high utility reports of any buyer types, and also optimal for
low utility reports of the high buyer types, but are distorted for low buyer types re-
porting low utility types. Prices in the optimal menu can be chosen to compensate
buyers for an optimal level of information rent. As expected, the level of distortion
is increasing in the relative weight of high types, and increasing in the difference of
the effects of private information. If the buyer type is reported in a truthful mecha-
nism in the first period, any dynamic changes of allocations are a reflection of time
changes of the possible type values, which are common knowledge. The contribu-
tion of this worked application is to extend the analysis of the dynamic interaction
between a principal and an agent of two possible types, who has private informa-
tion about his future demand and about the likelihood of that demand being high
or low, also allowing the demand types and the likelihood to vary in a general way
over time.
It is important to look at such dynamic contractual relationships, since they are
of major importance in an economy. As information technology advances, track-
ing customers becomes easier and can lead to better tailored products and offers
[Miravete, 2003]. Handling such long term data can improve the customer screen-
ing potential of companies which have the resources. Examples are businesses that
sell memberships to repeat clients. They have the ability to enforce long term con-
tracts, and the service usage can be carefully monitored. Moreover, the service to
users can be charged at different rates based on quantity brackets, and the seller
can package utility increasing features into the contract. The contracts themselves
come with initial or overtime financial commitments. The consumer will arguably
have knowledge of his potential usage pattern, defining a possible buyer type, and
his monthly consumption choice would be equivalent to reporting a period spe-
cific type – by the taxation principle. One can consider also monopolistic suppliers
selling to a small business, or franchise owners dealing with individual franchises.
The agent companies and franchises hold specific private information about the
profitability of the business, as well as about the day to day sales potential, which
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would determine short term profits. Long term strategy must incorporate the in-
formation from repeated interaction.
The approach of this paper is novel also because of the method of analysis em-
ployed. As is standard in the literature, incentive compatibility constraints nec-
essary for a direct truthful mechanism have to be introduced in the maximiza-
tion problem. The goal is to restrict the relevant set of incentive compatibility
constraints.1 To simplify the problem consider, in a first stage, consider only the
compatibility constraints that have to be satisfied after the contract is signed, and
after the buyer reports truthfully the private information he has ex ante. These
constrains ignore the buyers that have misreported their initial private informa-
tion. With only this subset of constraints, sayW , the optimal menu space consid-
ered is wider than allowed, so any menu found satisfyingW that is also incentive
compatible ex ante will be fully optimal. With the problem thus divided, the next
step involves finding conditions that restrict the large space of viable parameters –
these conditions are equivalent toW holding. Then maximization conditions are
applied to this restricted set of parameters, so that the solution is fully incentive
compatible. Because distortions in allocations arise as a result of ex ante private
information, the more analytically involved problem is figuring out correct alloca-
tions that satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints between ex ante types. The
benefit of this method is that the analytically difficult part can be separated, and
expressions are solved in a problem with far fewer parameters.
This type of contracting problem is important since agent private information
that comes in sequentially is realistic in many settings. As a qualitative justifica-
tion for this assertion, consider the problem faced by a gym, trying to sell gym
memberships. For simplicity, assume there are only two kinds of buyers: a heavy
gym user type, and a light user type. The light user type is more likely to only
want access to basic machines and facilities, while the heavy user type will more
often require specific facilities (pool, squash court, fitness classes), in addition to
the basics. In this example, the heavy and light users are our high and low types,
and the momentary need for facilities in the gym is the period by period utility
type. Both the heavy and the light users know what they will likely want, but
don’t yet know when that would happen. The difference is understood to be in
the frequency of this demand. The results suggests a low type should be offered a
basic membership package, with pay-per-use access to the facilities not included,
while a high type should be offered an extensive package, which comes with a
discount on more facilities, and which is worthwhile only for a heavy user. The
discount would correspond to the information rent paid to the high type, since he
has the option of buying the basic package.
Courty and Li [2000] study a similar problem about the allocation of an indi-
visible good, where private information is linked across only two time periods.
Both a discrete two-type case and a continuum of types are considered. In the first
period the agent finds out his type, which partially restricts the buyer’s possible
1In settings with continuous types, additional assumptions on the distribution related to the
inverse hazard rate or first order stochastic dominance have precisely this function.
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valuations for the ticket in the future. The informativeness of the buyer’s private
information can differ both in the sense of first order stochastic dominance – when
the high type knows he values a ticket more than the low type, or in the sense of a
mean-preserving spread – when the high type is more uncertain about the value of
the ticket. The first period information can be used by the principal to propose an
interim contract to increase his returns, compared to signing the contract ex post
when the agent has all the private information. Considering contracts with partial
refunds, the authors find that the informativeness of the signal the buyer gets is
what determines the optimal mechanisms, and not the uncertainty that affects all
the buyer types. The virtual value determined in the continuous type case is sug-
gestive of the allocations determined in this paper. In both cases, the distortion of
the low type is proportional to the informativeness of the initial agent type and the
relative difference in the utility types. The private information that the buyer has
before signing the contract is what leads to information rents and to distortions of
future allocations from the first-best. Therefore, one would expect that the present
set-up induces distortions at arbitrary periods similarly, to account for the same
private information. However, that cannot be directly deduced, since the utility
type reports in future periods can provide information on the initial buyer type, so
the dynamic game is not separable into independent games at different periods.
The present paper can be seen as extending some of their results to an arbitrary,
possibly infinite, number of periods.
Battaglini [2005] considers an alternative approach, with a dynamic interaction
between a buyer and a seller in infinite time, much like in this paper, where agent
utility can change period by period based on a discrete utility type determinant,
and this type is linked across time by a Markov (memoryless) process. It is as-
sumed that types are positively correlated across time, that is, a high type is more
likely than a low type to become a high type again. The incipient type evolution
in the first two periods is the same as in the present paper, which will consider
that types are correlated across time based on a common distribution, so it is no
surprise that the allocations are also the same. After the second period, the dy-
namics diverge: in Battaglini [2005] the distortion for the low report type remains
only after a history of low-type reports, and is probabilistically reduced progres-
sively until it vanishes at infinity; in this paper the distorted allocation for a low
type report is maintained indifferent of the history of low-type reports, and does
not converge to the first best. Rustichini and Wolinsky [1995] work with another
simpler model with Markov types in which the strategic agent behavior is limited,
and the focus is on the principal’s learning of the demand environment.
Boleslavsky and Said [2013] examine a model with a dynamic interaction be-
tween a buyer and a seller, which shares many of the features of the model herein.
The significant differences are that (i) they use a continuous buyer distribution
with positive support – i.e., there are no gaps in buyer types, and that (ii) the
shocks to the period by period utility type of the buyer have a very specific struc-
ture, with persistent effect – the buyer’s value is proportional to the product of the
history of shocks. The no-gap-in-buyer-type assumption is necessary, given the
analysis method, much like in Pavan et al. [2014a], because of the use of the enve-
5
lope theorem to restrict incentive compatibility constraints. The assumption of the
buyer value as a product of shocks is however more consequential. It makes any
shock to the valuation of the buyer infinitely persistent, and its multiplicative form
leads to a “path-independence” property for allocations, which is used in reducing
the number of compatibility constraints considered, thus simplifying the analysis.
The optimal allocations derived start with “honeymoon phases” of advantageous
prices of different lengths, and demanding different entry costs, which serve to
screen the buyer types.
In a very important recent paper, Pavan et al. [2014a] attempt to characterize
general dynamic mechanism design problems in finite and infinite time. They con-
sider a general stochastic process for information, with possibly non-time-separable
agent payoffs. To obtain more explicit results, they require continuity in the prob-
ability measure that determines types, and in general, continuity in the total vari-
ation metric.The results do not translate to discrete type settings, where the dif-
ferential methods cannot apply, however, they are quite general, and the intuition
described is informative. In particular, the authors note that the change in informa-
tiveness of the period-by-period report of the buyer determines the change in time
of the allocation distortion. In the present paper, the optimal truthful mechanism
requires reporting the buyer type in the first period, which implies that the alloca-
tion distortions in subsequent periods should be the same, since future reports are
equally informative for the seller.
2 A General Discrete Model for the Buyer’s Problem
Consider a setting with a monopolistic principal, or seller, and an agent, or buyer.
The seller and the buyer are interacting over possibly infinitely many periods t ∈
{0,1, . . . ,n}. The buyer can be of one of a finite set of types, indexed by α, and
the ex-ante distribution of α types is common knowledge. Furthermore, let θ be
the period-by-period utility type of the buyer, which can take any value from the
finite set {θ1, . . . ,θl}, and define the probability mass function of buyer type α over
utility types θ to be λα(·), which has full support.
Let the buyer’s utility function at time t be Ut(θt,qt(·), pt(·)), possibly time de-
pendent, discounted if needed.2 For any α and t, θt can take any of the finite set
of values {θ1, . . . ,θl}, and the allocation qt(h0, h1, . . . , ht) and price pt(h0, h1, . . . , ht)
are a function of the history of messages h0, h1, . . . , ht previously sent by the buyer.
At time 0, the buyer is assumed to report his buyer type α, receive no allocation
and make no payment. Because the seller will be able to commit, he can delay
payment so U0 ≡ 0 is w.l.o.g., with the outside option of the buyer normalized to
0. The reports ht are determined by a function of the buyer’s true type, demand
type history, and a history of past reports, ht ≡ σt(α,θ1,θ2, . . . ,θt, h˜0, . . . , h˜t−1), where
2With infinite periods, a sufficient condition is that the overall payoff is the dis-
counted sum of a per-period utility function that is uniformly bounded. That is, ∃δ ∈
[0,1), ∃B s.t. maxθt ,qt ,pt |δ−tUt(θt,qt, pt)| < B, which implies ∑t Ut(·) < ∞ [Fudenberg and Tirole,
1991, p. 110].
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σ ≡ {σt(·)} is the player’s strategy. With h0 ≡ σ0(α), h1 = σ1(α,θ1,σ0(α)), . . . , ht is
determined recursively by σ on the path of play. To simplify notation, Θji and H
j
i
will represent the ordered tuples (θi,θi+1, . . . ,θ j) and (hi, hi+1, . . . , hj) or, in a slight
abuse of notation, the sets of such tuples.
The buyer utility type θ is private information in every round, and he is also
privately informed about his type α before the contract is signed. There is a com-
mon prior over the distribution of the buyer types α. The seller has the power
to commit to a contract and is risk neutral. Both buyer and seller are expected
utility maximizers, and not liquidity constrained. Based on the revelation princi-
ple, the following derivations restrict attention to direct truthful mechanisms. The
game starts in period 0, with the buyer reporting his α value – in other words,
his buyer type, after which he may have to make a payment, although we may as-
sume w.l.o.g. that the payment is deferred to the subsequent rounds. In subsequent
rounds, the buyer reports his θ utility type in each round, receives an allocation q
and makes a new payment. In the following, the focus is on a game with infinite
periods, but sometimes I may also consider a finite period game for description or
as a stepping stone. The results will hold for the finite as well as infinite settings.
In the finite case I will ignore discounting.
2.1 Reducing the number of ICC conditions
It is interesting to consider both the finite and the infinite time periods versions.
For the infinite setting, a recursive approach could be attempted, but simple con-
siderations show that the number of relevant state variables grows linearly in
time, and it is not immediate in what way one can summarize the relevant his-
tory. Therefore, looking at the optimal direct mechanism for the finite game is
easier, and could possibly be extended with a continuity argument to the infinite
setting. For that, one typically considers rationality and incentive compatibility
constraints, which are then incorporated in a global maximization problem. How-
ever, as the number of time periods grows, the number of incentive compatibility
conditions will also grow polynomially.
It is important then to reduce this number as much as possible before proceed-
ing to any analysis. The first step is proving that the relevant incentive compatibil-
ity conditions can be restricted. Any direct truthful mechanism that implements a
menu will have to satisfy individual rationality constraints (IRCs) for each α, since
the buyer has ex-ante information about his type before he signs a contract. With
the initial period utility and the outside option at 0,
∀α : 0≤
n
∑
t=1
∑
Θt1
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(α,Θt1), pt(α,Θ
t
1)),
where Θt1 = (θ
1, . . . ,θt) is one possible sub-history of utility types for period 1 to
period t, and λα(θi) is the probability of getting the value θi that is given by the
distribution indicated by α. In addition, the buyer may consider participating in
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each subsequent round, generating other IRCs at each period k ≥ 1:
∀k ≥ 1,α, Hk−10 ,θk : 0≤Uk(θk,qk(Hk−10 ,θk), pk(Hk−10 ,θk))+
+
n
∑
t=k+1
∑
Θtk|θk
t
∏
i=k+1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(Hk−10 ,Θ
t
k), pt(H
k−1
0 ,Θ
t
k)),
where Hk−10 = (h
0, h1, . . . , hk−1) is a history of past reports and Θtk|θk = (θk, . . . ,θt)
any following sub-history of true reports, conditional on the first report being θk.
Because the seller has the flexibility to set the payment schedule, these additional
IRCs will not constrain the result, implying that the buyer is not required to com-
mit for all time periods.3 The incentive compatibility constraints (ICCs) for a direct
truthful mechanism are:
∀σ,α :
n
∑
t=1
∑
Θt1
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(α,Θt1), pt(α,Θ
t
1)) ≥
n
∑
t=1
∑
Θt1
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(Ht0), pt(H
t
0)).
(1)
where Hn0 = (h
0, h1, . . . , hn) is given by σ. In particular, these expressions include
the compatibility conditions for deviations at specific sub-histories only.
Proposition 2.1. The set of incentive compatibility conditions (1) is satisfied if a stronger
set of compatibility conditions (S) hold, whereby in each period and after any history
the buyer considers only one-time deviations from truth, followed by truthful reporting
in the future. That is, the ICCs are implied by the following set of inequalities, for k ∈
0,n , ∀ σ,α,Θk1 :
Uk(θk,qk(Hk−10 ,θ
k), pk(Hk−10 ,θ
k))+
+
n
∑
t=k+1
∑
Θtk|θk
t
∏
j=k+1
λα(θ
j)Ut(θt,qt(Hk−10 ,Θ
t
k), pt(H
k−1
0 ,Θ
t
k)) ≥
≥Uk(θk,qk(Hk0), pk(Hk0))+
+
n
∑
t=k+1
∑
Θtk+1
t
∏
j=k+1
λα(θ
j)Ut(θt,qt(Hk0,Θ
t
k+1), pt(H
k
0,Θ
t
k+1)),
where Hn0 is given by σ.
Proof. For now let n < ∞. The proof is by induction. First consider a finite setting
with n periods. Let σ be any strategy, and consider a deviation from this strategy to
3See Proposition 3.1 for an example.
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truth telling, only in the last period n, on only one of the possible histories. Assume
the following inequality holds. ∀ σ,α,Θn1 :
Un(θn,qn(Hn−10 ,θ
n), pn(Hn−10 ,θ
n)) ≥Un(θn,qn(Hn0 ), pn(Hn0 )). (2)
It is just a special case of (1), and of (S) when k = n. Now, for a generic σ, it implies
that ∀ α:
n
∑
t=1
∑
Θt1
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(Ht0), pt(H
t
0)) ≤
n−1
∑
t=1
∑
Θt1
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(Ht0), pt(H
t
0))+
+∑
Θn1
n
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Un(θn,qn(Hn−10 ,θ
n), pn(Hn−10 ,θ
n)),
so it makes sense to always report truthfully in the last period. This is the first
step in the induction process. In general, consider that the following holds for an
arbitrary 0 ≤ k ≤ n, i.e. that it is better to report truthfully from period k + 1 on.
∀ σ,α :
n
∑
t=1
∑
Θt1
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(Ht0), pt(H
t
0)) ≤
k
∑
t=1
∑
Θt1
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(Ht0), pt(H
t
0))+
+
n
∑
t=k+1
∑
Θt1
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(Hk0,Θ
t
k+1), pt(H
k
0,Θ
t
k+1)).
Assume that S hold. S say that, given future truthful reporting, the buyer finds
the total discounted utility from reporting his true type today is larger than for
any other report. Notice that this has to hold for all α, and for any history prior to
period k. Using S , rework the previous expression.
∀ σ,α :
n
∑
t=1
∑
Θt1
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(Ht0), pt(H
t
0)) ≤
k−1
∑
t=1
∑
Θt1
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(Ht0), pt(H
t
0)) +∑
Θk1
k
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Uk(θk,qk(Hk0), pk(H
k
0))+
n
∑
t=k+1
∑
Θt1
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(Hk0,Θ
t
k+1), pt(H
k
0,Θ
t
k+1)) =
9
=
k−1
∑
t=1
∑
Θt1
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(Ht0), pt(H
t
0)) +∑
Θk1
k
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)
[
Uk(θk,qk(Hk0), pk(H
k
0))+
n
∑
t=k+1
∑
Θt1|Θk1
t
∏
j=k+1
λα(θ
j) Ut(θt,qt(Hk0,Θ
t
k+1), pt(H
k
0,Θ
t
k+1))
]
≤
≤
k−1
∑
t=1
∑
Θt1
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(Ht0), pt(H
t
0)) +∑
Θk1
k
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)
[
Uk(θk,qk(Hk−10 ,θ
k), pk(Hk−10 ,θ
k))+
n
∑
t=k+1
∑
Θt1|Θk1
t
∏
j=k+1
λα(θ
j) Ut(θt,qt(Hk−10 ,Θ
t
k), pt(H
k−1
0 ,Θ
t
k))
]
=
k−1
∑
t=1
∑
Θt1
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(Ht0), pt(H
t
0)) +
n
∑
t=k
∑
Θt1
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(Hk−10 ,Θ
t
k), pt(H
k−1
0 ,Θ
t
k)).
This result is the induction step, which takes us to k = 1. The last step is applying
the 0-period ICC, which is also in S. Therefore, we have used expressions S to
obtain the ICCs.
Now consider n = ∞. The partial sum from k to ∞, of the series that gives the
buyer’s utility is
∞
∑
t=k
∑
Θt1
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(Ht0), pt(H
t
0)), (3)
which is bounded and must go to 0 as k→∞, implicit if the infinite sums in the ICC
conditions are well defined.4 For an infinite direct mechanism that implements a
menu, say that the infinite set of constraints S will hold. Let σ represent an opti-
mal but not necessarily truthful strategy, mapping any buyer type and sequence of
utility types to optimal reports, and let τ be the truthful strategy. The proof idea is
to devise an approximate strategy that is a "truncated" version of σ, in which the
buyer reports according with the strategy σ up to period k, and then he reports
truthfully, so according to τ. Let σk be that strategy. Then it must be that the payoff
from the new strategy is an increasingly good approximation as k increases, since
only the partial sum from k on is changed, i.e., Vσk → Vσ as k→ ∞5. Fix k, and
apply the compatibility conditions in S from period k backwards to prove, again
by induction, that the completely truthful strategy is weakly better than the "trun-
cated" σ, which approximates in payoff the original, i.e., ∀k ≥ 0 : Vτ ≥ Vσk . But by
assumption Vτ ≤ Vσ, so letting k go to infinity gives us by dominated convergence
that Vτ = Vσ. We obtain that truthful reporting is weakly optimal in the context of
a menu satisfying S , which implies that that S are more restrictive than the ICCs,
so the regular ICCs have to hold when S hold.
4For example, it is sufficient to express Ut as a weakly concave utility function multiplied with
geometric discounting, and assume an upper bound on the money transfers in any period.
5Vσ is a shorthand for the value of expression (3) evaluated for strategy σ.
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Intuitively, the alternative conditions of Proposition 2.1 allow us to improve,
step by step, any non-truthful strategy by considering deviations towards truthful
reporting. Starting with an arbitrary strategy σ the last period, it must be that, if it
is preferable for the buyer to not lie regardless of the past history, he will improve
on σ by reporting truthfully. This must hold after any history, so we immediately
have that in the last period S implies truthful reporting. This allows us to move
to the previous period, where we again observe, history by history, that truthful
reporting is preferred, and so on by backward induction. This is possible since
there are compatibility conditions for any α type at each node; i.e., it is optimal
for the buyer not to lie, assuming truthful reporting in the future, even if he isn’t
supposed to get this menu because he misrepresented his α. It is thus possible
to improve onto any σ by deviating towards the truthful strategy. Once there, it
follows that S restrict the possible mechanisms at least as much as the ICCs, since
the truthful strategy is optimal only if the ICCs hold.
The result holds for n = ∞ also, and the proof is by contradiction. Starting
again with a possibly non-truthful strategy σ, we can approximate it by assuming
that after period k the buyer decides to report truthfully. Only after period k will
his utility be changed by the new strategy, and the change is small if k is large.
This must be true as long as his lifetime utility expressed as an infinite sum over
periods is well defined; then the partial sum over time must converge. With the
new strategy it is possible to use conditions in S as before, to prove by backward
induction that true reporting is superior to the approximated σ. Then, in the limit
k→ ∞, we must have that the true strategy is as good as σ. But this statement is
precisely the requirement that truthful strategies satisfy the ICCs, which is what
we need to prove.
Proposition 2.2. The set of ICCs in (1) imply a weaker set of compatibility conditions
(W) in which the buyer, who has reported his true type α if he is in periods after the 0th,
considers only one-time deviations from truth, followed by truthful reporting in the future.
That is, the ICCs imply the following inequalities, for6 k ∈ 0,n , ∀ σ,α,Θk1 :
Uk(θk,qk(α, Hk−11 ,θ
k), pk(α, Hk−11 ,θ
k))+
+
n
∑
t=k+1
∑
Θt1|Θk1
t
∏
j=k+1
λα(θ
j)Ut(θt,qt(α, Hk−11 ,Θ
t
k), pt(α, H
k−1
1 ,Θ
t
k)) ≥
≥Uk(θk,qk(α, Hk1), pk(α, Hk1))+
+
n
∑
t=k+1
∑
Θt1|Θk1
t
∏
j=k+1
λα(θ
j)Ut(θt,qt(α, Hk1,Θ
t
k+1), pt(α, H
k
1,Θ
t
k+1)),
and
n
∑
t=1
∑
Θt1
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(α,Θt1), pt(α,Θ
t
1))≥
n
∑
t=1
∑
Θt1
t
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Ut(θt,qt(h0,Θt1), pt(h
0,Θt1)).
6At k = 0, U0 = 0 as defined.
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Proof. The proof is obvious, and the idea is to observe that the compatibility condi-
tions expressed inW can be seen as just a subset of the ICCs. For the last inequal-
ity above, it is obvious. In general, consider the ICC for two strategies, the truthful
strategy and a deviation to the strategy that reports truthfully except after a history
(α, Hk−11 ), when σk(α,Θ
k−1
1 ,θ
k) = hk and, subsequently, again truthful reporting af-
ter any continuation history. One can simplify the ICC by eliminating the payoffs
for the histories Θn1 − Θn1 |{(α, Hk−11 ,θk)} and their continuations, which must be
equal, to get:
k
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Uk(θk,qk(α, Hk−11 ,θ
k), pk(α, Hk−11 ,θ
k))+
+
k
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)
n
∑
t=k+1
∑
Θt1|(α,Hk−11 ,θk)
t
∏
j=k+1
λα(θ
j)Ut(θt,qt(α, Hk−11 ,Θ
t
k), pt(α, H
k−1
1 ,Θ
t
k)) ≥
≥
k
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)Uk(θk,qk(α, Hk1), pk(α, H
k
1))+
+
k
∏
i=1
λα(θ
i)
n
∑
t=k+1
∑
Θt1|(α,Hk−11 ,θk)
t
∏
j=k+1
λα(θ
j)Ut(θt,qt(α, Hk1,Θ
t
k+1), pt(α, H
k
1,Θ
t
k+1))
Simplify the common factor to get the generic compatibility condition of W . In
this construction, we haven’t assumed n < ∞, so the result holds for the infinite
setting.
The proof rests on the observation that, if reporting truthfully is always better
than not, then it is also better than lying only once, and that the continuation util-
ities for a person who considers lying once are the same as for a person who may
have misrepresented his past utility types – θ, as long as he is the same buyer type
α. This is true because future payoffs depend only on reports and the buyer type,
which are both assumed the same. So having compatibility conditions in each pe-
riod checking whether a buyer prefers lying for that period to true reporting is
equivalent to considering some of the ICCs.
We can therefore say W ⊂ ICCs, and W ⊂ S is by definition. Proposition 2.1
says that if a menu satisfies S , then it also satisfies the ICCs, so we can think of the
set of possible menus under S as more restrictive than those that satisfy the ICCs.
In general, a menu implemented by a mechanism will be a point in the menu pa-
rameter space. The sets of conditionsW ,S , ICCs will delimit a subset of this space,
where the menus inside obey the conditions. Let D[·] denote the subset. Then we
must have D[S ] ⊂ D[ICCs] ⊂ D[W] (Figure 1). Now consider the maximization
problem that determines the optimal mechanism. To find the optimal truthful
mechanism we need to restrict the domain of menus to D[ICCs]. A containing
domain may generate a false maximum, if it is located outside D[ICCs], while a
subdomain can lead to maxima on its boundaries that could be suboptimal. To
solve for the optimal mechanism in the application that follows, my strategy will
be to find the optimal menu in D[W ] and show that it is in D[S ].
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WICCs
S
Figure 1: The restricted domains according to W ,S , ICCs in the menu parameter
space.
The private information of the buyer is separated into two parts: the type α,
which is private knowledge ex-ante, and the type θ, which is conditionally dis-
tributed according to α and known after the contract is signed. Intuitively, this
methods relies on the fact that we can always segregate the private information of
the buyer in such a way. After that,W is the set of constraints that insure truthful
reporting once α is known, so any mechanism constrained by W will be optimal
as long as the contract has payments at time 0 which incentivize the truthful re-
porting of α. Since the value of the relationship between the buyer and the seller
conditional on α is common knowledge, this is always possible.
3 An Application with Two Types
In the following application, the buyer is of two possible types, and has two pos-
sible utility types. The buyer’s utility in any one time period is given by
Ut(θt,qt, pt) = θtqt − (qt)2/2− pt(qt),
where qt is the buyer’s consumption in period t, pt is the price he pays for it,
henceforth determined by qt. θt is the utility or demand type, and can take one of
the values {θth,θtl}, which are common knowledge.7 The buyer has ex-ante private
information about the probability of having a utility type θth instead of θ
t
l in any one
7It is common to consider the quadratic portion, q2/2, as a cost to the seller for producing quan-
tity q. If we define the price net of cost, it does not change the analysis or interpretation.
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Figure 2: Moves by nature determining types. The vertical dotted line shows when
the contract is signed.
period. This probability is determined by the buyer’s type, and can take the values
{αth,1 − αth} or {αtl ,1 − αtl}, also common knowledge. Using the notation of the
general set-up, αth ≡ λh(θth), 1− αth ≡ λh(θtl ), αtl ≡ λl(θth), and 1− αtl ≡ λl(θtl ). The
common prior is that the high and low buyer types appear with odds {ϕ,1− ϕ}
respectively. This setting is sketched in Figure 2. The game starts in period 0, with
the buyer reporting his buyer type – so future α values, and he reports his utility
type in each subsequent round – the θ value, receiving his allocation qt and making
a new payment. For all t, let θth > θ
t
l ≥ 0, 1 > αth > αtl > 0, 1 > ϕ > 0.8 To relate to
literature, observe that αth > α
t
l implies that the draw from {αth,1− αth} first-order
stochastically dominates the draw from {αtl ,1− αtl}. The initial results in section
2.1 were derived without making assumptions on Ut(θt,qt, pt) and only requiring
that all θt are from the same discrete set. In the following, the time index will be
dropped for clarity. The arguments are the same for all periods considered, but the
values of θ and α are allowed to change over time provided that the inequalities
and the common knowledge assumptions above hold.
3.1 Fixing some of the allocations
The next step is to reduce the possible ways in which a menu representing a truth-
ful mechanism can be constructed. The goal is to obtain specific expressions for
8Strict inequalities are assumed to consider interesting cases. The results hold in the limit.
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allocations, and to interpret and describe the equilibrium. This section shows
through a few lemmas that the optimal menu must have first best allocations for
reports of θh, as well as for θl after type αh was reported. The following lemmas
hold for any n ≤∞, and also if we rephrase them with S instead ofW .
Lemma 3.1. Consider any period with allocations. Denote with qh,ql the quantities and
ph, pl the prices in the menu offered to the buyer in that period, contingent upon the θ-type
report, and let uh,ul be the expected continuation utilities for the buyer, given by the buyer
type and truthful reporting in the future. Then, if conditions W hold, it must be that
qh ≥ ql.
Proof. Assume the W compatibility conditions in the period hold. By them it is
w.l.o.g. that in the future the player will report truthfully. Then there are only two
continuation values that are needed to describe a player’s incentives, say uh and
ul, and:
θhqh − q2h/2− ph + uh ≥ θhql − q2l /2− pl + ul
θlql − q2l /2− pl + ul ≥ θlqh − q2h/2− ph + uh.
We can rewrite the equations to:
θh(qh − ql) ≥ ph − pl + q2h/2− q2l /2+ ul − uh
ph − pl + q2h/2− q2l /2+ ul − uh ≥ θl(qh − ql),
from which one can deduce that (θh− θl)(qh− ql)≥ 0. Since θh > θl, we must have
that qh ≥ ql. This lemma remains true if we replaceW with S , because we would
have similar inequalities for each pair uαl ,u
α
h, leading to the same conclusion.
The result can be understood to mean that, if ql > qh and if a buyer with θl
prefers the low allocation and price to the high ones, then the buyer with θh must
prefer it too, because his total utility is increased more by an increase in the allo-
cation, and future utility is determined only by today’s report, and not by today’s
true type. But this evidently contradicts a compatibility condition.
Lemma 3.2. Consider any period with allocations in the game described. Denote with
qh,ql the quantities and ph, pl the prices in the menu offered to the buyer in that period,
and let uh,ul be the expected continuation utilities. Assuming thatW hold, it must be that
qh ≥ θh and ql ≤ θl in the optimal menu.
Proof. Prove by contradiction, i.e., assume that qh < θh. Then ∃e> 0 s.t. qh + e< θh.
Now consider the following changes in the menu offered: qh → qh + e, and ph →
ph + (θh − qh)e− e2/2. Observe that both qh and ph are strictly increased.
The new expected utility of the buyer, when he truthfully reports θh, is:
θh(qh + e)− (qh + e)2/2− (ph + (θh − qh)e− e2/2) + uh = θhqh − q2h/2− ph + uh.
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When the buyer reports θl, everything stays the same. Now verify that the new
incentive compatibility conditions will also be satisfied:
θh(qh + e)− (qh + e)2/2− (ph + (θh − qh)e− e2/2) + uh ≥ θhql − q2l /2− pl + ul
θlql − q2l /2− pl + ul ≥ θl(qh + e)− (qh + e)2/2− (ph + (θh − qh)e− e2/2) + uh
⇔
θhqh − q2h/2− ph + uh ≥ θhql − q2l /2− pl + ul
θlql − q2l /2− pl + ul ≥ θlqh − q2h/2− ph − (θh − θl)e+ uh.
Because (θh − θl)e > 0, the old incentive compatibility conditions imply that these
hold. Any other constraints, either incentive compatibility constraints at other
nodes or individual rationality constraints, will not be changed, because the ex-
pected utility for the buyer does not change. Therefore we have found that there
is a way to strictly improve the seller’s expected return, without changing the ex-
pected payoff of the buyer. So this allocation is not optimal, therefore qh ≥ θh.
For the statement ql ≤ θl, prove by contradiction by assuming that ql ≥ θl. Then
∃e > 0 s.t. ql − e > θl. Now change the menu offered: ql → ql − e, and pl →
pl + (ql − θl)e − e2/2. Observe that ql is strictly decreased while pl is strictly in-
creased. The new expected utility for the buyer that truthfully reports θl does not
change:
θl(ql − e)− (ql − e)2/2− (pl + (ql − θl)e− e2/2) + ul = θlql − q2l /2− pl + ul.
Neither does the utility of the buyer that truthfully reports θh. The new incentive
compatibility constraints are:
θhqh − q2h/2− ph + uh ≥ θh(ql − e)− (ql − e)2/2− (pl + (ql − θl)e− e2/2) + ul
θl(ql − e)− (ql − e)2/2− (pl + (ql − θl)e− e2/2) + ul ≥ θlqh − q2h/2− ph + uh
⇔
θhqh − q2h/2− ph + uh ≥ θhql − q2l /2− pl − (θh − θl)e+ ul
θlql − q2l /2− pl + ul ≥ θlqh − q2h/2− ph + uh.
These new conditions must hold if the old ones did. Also, no other compatibility or
rationality conditions will be changed. So this change improves the seller’s return,
therefore it must be that ql ≥ θl was suboptimal.
This lemma shows that the θh type must always be allocated at least the first
best in an optimal mechanism, because one can always increase a suboptimal allo-
cation, and then charge a higher price to compensate his utility increase, and this
change will not make the report θh better for any lower utility type. Similarly, al-
locating more than the first best to the low utility type is suboptimal because, if
the allocations is greater, then the seller can decrease it marginally, and compen-
sate by an increase in price, and this compensation would leave the lowest type
indifferent, but for all the other types it would be insufficient, therefore leaving
any constraints relaxed.
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Lemma 3.3. Assume that in the setting presentedW hold, and the results of the previous
lemmas. Then, for every period, for each history, at most one of the compatibility conditions
inW for an agent α will bind.
Proof. Write again the ICCs:
θhqh − q2h/2− ph + uh ≥ θhql − q2l /2− pl + ul
θlql − q2l /2− pl + ul ≥ θlqh − q2h/2− ph + uh.
Assume that both conditions above hold with equality. Then
θh(qh − ql) = q2h/2+ ph − uh − q2l /2− pl + ul
θl(qh − ql) = q2h/2+ ph − uh − q2l /2− pl + ul,
so θh(qh − ql) = θl(qh − ql). Because qh ≥ θh > θl ≥ ql, we have a contradiction.
From the previous lemma, we can also see that the high and low utility type al-
locations must be different, by the conditions inW . If more than one compatibility
conditions hold, then it says that the difference in utilities minus the difference in
prices for two alternatives has to be 0, and for more than one utility type. This is
not possible because utility differences for the same allocations are strictly mono-
tone in θ. A more general formulation of utility that would preserve the result has
Uθ(θ,q) > 0, and Uθ,q(θ,q) > 0 (known as the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condi-
tion).
Lemma 3.4. Consider any period with allocations, and assume the compatibility condition
inW for the buyer with θh-type utility does not bind. Then ql ≥ θl. Similarly, if the θl-type
condition does not bind, then qh ≤ θh.
Proof. Say that ql < θl. Then ∃e> 0 s.t. ql + e< θl. Consider the menu transforma-
tion ql→ ql + e, pl→ pl + (θl − ql)e− e2/2. Then, the new incentive compatibility
conditions will be:
θhqh − q2h/2− ph + uh ≥ θh(ql + e)− (ql + e)2/2− pl + (θl − ql)e− e2/2+ ul
θl(ql + e)− (ql + e)2/2− pl + (θl − ql)e− e2/2+ ul ≥ θlqh − q2h/2− ph + uh.
⇔
θhqh − q2h/2− ph + uh ≥ θhql − q2l /2− pl + ul + (θh − θl)e
θlql − q2l /2− pl + ul ≥ θlqh − q2h/2− ph + uh.
As long as e is small enough, the first incentive compatibility condition will hold
for the new menu. Moreover, the expected revenue of the seller is strictly increased
without affecting the buyer’s utility. For the second part of the statement, consider
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now qh→ qh − e, ph→ ph + (qh − θh)e− e2/2. After reworking, the new incentive
compatibility conditions will be:{
θhqh − q2h/2− ph + uh ≥ θhql − q2l /2− pl + ul
θlql − q2l /2− pl + ul ≥ θlqh − q2h/2− ph + uh + (θh − θl)e.
If the θl compatibility condition will not bind, then for a small enough e the above
conditions will hold. As before, the seller’s expected revenue is increased, but the
buyer’s payoffs are left the same.
Decreasing the high utility allocations marginally towards the first best and
then compensating the price will leave the high utility type indifferent, but it will
improve the high report option for the other type. However, if the old compati-
bility constraint was slack, a marginal increase in the high type allocation will not
violate the it. Similarly, one can argue that increasing the low type allocation to-
wards the first best and then compensating the low utility type with a higher price
will also be an improvement, but only if the high type’s compatibility constraint is
slack.
3.2 Solving the maximization problem
From now on assumeW hold and that, in every period with allocations, the θl-type
incentive compatibility condition does not bind, while for the case with σ0 = αh
the θh-type compatibility condition will also not have to bind, i.e., it is slack. With
the previous lemmas, the assumption gives us that, in every period after the 0th,
qh = θh, and that after σ0 = αh we must have in every subsequent period ql = θl.
Moreover, at period 0, we assume that only the rationality constraint for the αl-
type and the compatibility constraint for the αh-type bind. The proof requires that
we verify the assumptions after we find the solution.
With the assumptions above, the allocations after reporting αh are fixed. The
seller needs to optimize the low demand type allocations if the buyer reported αl
in period 0. Since we have assumed that only the αl-type compatibility condition
binds in period 0, we can maximize the seller’s value, keeping track of the fact that
the information rent earned by an αh buyer pretending to have the αl type must be
subtracted with the appropriate weight.
Lemma 3.5. Let v be the αl-type buyer value at the beginning of any period t ≥ 1, vh and
vl the buyer continuation value after a θth and θ
t
l report respectively, and P(v), P(vh) and
P(vl)9 the corresponding seller values. The simplified seller’s maximization problem can
be recursively stated as:
P(v) = max
{ph,pl ,vh,vl ,ql}
(1− ϕ)[αl ph + (1− αl)pl] + α′lδP(vh) + (1− α′l)δP(vl)+
ϕ[−αh(θ2h/2− ph)− (1− αh)(θlql − q2l /2− pl)] + C (4)
9Time indices are dropped for simplicity. Future type probabilities are denoted by a prime
symbol.
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Figure 3: Node sets determining buyer values in the recursive formulation, for the
first period with allocations.
s.t. (i) θ2h/2− ph + δvh = θhql − q2l /2− pl + δvl,
(ii) v = αl(θ2h/2− ph) + (1− αl)(θlql − q2l /2− pl) + α′lδvh + (1− α′l)δvl,
(iii) ql ≥ 0.
Proof. Since the behavior of the αh type is already determined, the transfers and al-
locations on the αh branch are of no concern, except for the fact that the seller pays
information rent to the αh type based on the menu offered on the αl branch. Specif-
ically, with probability ϕ, the seller loses αh(θ2h/2− ph) + (1− αh)(θlql − q2l /2− pl)
in expectation to the αh type as information rent. With probability 1− ϕ, he gains
the expected payment of the αl type, αl ph + (1− αl)pl.10 C minus the period spe-
cific information rent is the seller’s gain from the αh type. Hence, the objective
function is the expected sum in (4).
By assumptions andW , the buyer reports θ truthfully if the constraint (i) holds.
Before having the period-specific private information, he current value of the buyer
10While the seller is now informed of the α type, he has to commit to the contract ex ante.
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is the expected gain from the trade, αl(θ2h/2− ph) + (1− αl)(θlql − q2l /2− pl), plus
the discounted future expected value, α′lδvh + (1− α′l)δvl, so (ii) holds. The alloca-
tions can only be positive, so (iii) holds.
The optimal mechanism chooses ph, pl,vl,ql to maximize seller value (including
the continuation value). The discounted expected continuation value is α′lδP(vh) +
(1− α′l)δP(vl). Since we assumed that the αl-type rationality constraint in period
0 holds with equality, we must have that v = 0 in the first period. Because there is
an indeterminacy in the price allocation, we can also fix vh = vl = 0 to find explicit
prices, but after we have determined the quantity allocations from the maximiza-
tion problem.
Proposition 3.1. Assuming that condition (iii) in Lemma 3.5 doesn’t bind, the allocation
of a low buyer type after reporting θl in the maximization problem (4) is always given by
ql = θl − (θh − θl) ϕ1− ϕ ·
αh − αl
1− αl ,
and, with v = 0 in the first period and with the normalization vh = vl = 0 in all periods,
ph =
θ2h
2
− (θh − θl)(1− αl)ql,
pl =(αl(θh − θl) + θl)ql −
q2l
2
.
(iii) holds with equality when θl(1−αl)
θh(αh−αl)+θl(1−αh) ≤ ϕ≤ 1, and in this case ql = 0, ph =
θ2h
2
and pl = 0 in that period.
Proof. First assume that (iii) doesn’t bind. Solve (i) and (ii) for ph and pl:
ph = −v + δvh +
θ2h
2
− ql(1− αl)(θh − θl),
pl = −
q2l
2
− v + vlδ+ ql(αl(θh − θl) + θl).
Replace these expressions into the maximization problem, and get the first order
conditions. The first order condition determining ql will be:
(1− αl)(−1+ ϕ)ql
−1+ ϕ +
θl(1+ αhϕ− ϕ− αl)− (αh − αl)θhϕ
−1+ ϕ = 0.
This solves for the ql expression. Observe that the allocation is determined for
every period after period 0. Because we ignored the non-negativity constraint (iii),
it is necessary to see if ql is positive. It turns out that a necessary and sufficient
condition for that is:
ϕ ≤ θl(1− αl)
θh(αh − αl) + θl(1− αh) .
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When this condition doesn’t hold, then ql = 0. To find the prices, it is necessary to
fix the indeterminacy by making some assumptions, because the seller can commit
on the contract offered, so changing the prices at period t by e and compensating
at period t + k by δ−ke leaves the buyer with equivalent choices. Moreover, there
is a one-to-one trade-off for the buyer and the truthful seller between vh or vl and
ph, pl. This suggests that neither the absolute, nor the relative values of the contin-
uation utilities vh,vl are fixed, and the easiest way to deal with them is to assume
vh = vl = 0. Of course, we have to check that the compatibility constraints of the
buyer that reports non-truthfully will also hold, but this assumption makes all the
four compatibility constraints for each node hold, because of (i). Using the as-
sumptions, we get the prices ph, pl in every period.
The next result gives the allocations and prices offered if the buyer reports αh
in period 0.
Proposition 3.2. Assuming that condition (iii) in Lemma 3.5 doesn’t bind, the allocations
after reporting αh are qh = θh and ql = θl, and
ph =
θ2h
2
− θhθl + αhθhθl + θ2l − αhθ2l
pl = αhθhθl +
θ2l
2
− αhθ2l ,
as well as a transfer of (αh−αl)(θh−θl)ql1−δ from the seller to cover the information rent for the
αh type buyer. When (iii) in Lemma 3.5 holds with equality in a period, there is no more
transfer from the seller, and the high buyer type allocations and prices in that period are,
q′h =
θ2h
2
, q′l = θl − (θh − θl)
αh
1− αh ,
p′h =
q2h
2
+ (θh − θl)ql, p′l =
q2l
2
.
Proof. Solve the following equations, representing the binding θh-type incentive
compatibility and the buyer value identity respectively, after assuming again v =
vh = vl = 0:
αh
(
θ2h
2
− ph
)
+ (1− αh)
(
θ2l
2
− pl
)
= 0,
θ2h
2
− ph = θhθl −
θ2l
2
− pl,
and this gives the results. We have assumed that the θh-type compatibility con-
dition must not bind, so that we can get ql = θl, yet we have obtained the above
21
solution making the exact opposite assumption. But that is fine, since the compat-
ibility condition is slack. To see that, change the solution above with a small value
κ:
ph =
θ2h
2
− θhθl + αhθhθl + θ2l − αhθ2l − (1− αh)κ
pl = αhθhθl +
θ2l
2
− αhθ2l + αhκ.
It is straightforward to check that, because the high and low demand compatibility
conditions cannot both bind at the same time, a κ small enough always exists that
will leave every condition satisfied with strict inequality. This allows us to deduce
that ql = θl was a good assumption.
When the non-negativity constraint (iii) binds, there is no more occasion for the
αh type to earn information rents from misrepresenting his type, because ql = 0
and the αl type pays for all the value, whichever θ he reports. At this point, the
seller should find it optimal to start distorting the θl allocation of the αh buyer
type. Formally, because the compatibility condition for the θh type binds, Lemma
3.4 does not imply q′l ≥ θl anymore. One can solve the problem as if only the αh
type exists in the standard way, and check the compatibility conditions. It is easy
to verify that the seller will extract the entire value, and with 0 transfers at time 0,
and the allocations from Proposition 3.1, all the incentive compatibility constraints
are satisfied.
Observe that the allocations and prices depend on the period only through the
values of the parameters {αth,l,θth,l}, which justifies dropping the time indices. It is
left to verify that all the assumptions on which individual rationality or compati-
bility conditions inW will bind have been correct. Because of the symmetry of the
allocations after reporting α, it is obvious that all the compatibility conditions in S
are also satisfied. It was assumed that the θh-type condition holds with equality, for
the buyer who has reported his true α, which means that the θl-type compatibility
condition will also hold. If the buyer has not reported his α-type truthfully, then
the compatibility conditions starting from period 1 will be essentially unchanged,
because of the symmetry of the allocations, which means that vh = vl.
The last thing to check are the conditions in period 0. The IRCs are satisfied by
construction. If an αh-type buyer reports α1l , then the information rent he earns is
given by:
vh = (α1h − α1l )(θ1h − θ1l )ql + δα2hvh + δ(1− α2h)vh,
which solves to
(α1h − α1l )(θ1h − θ1l )ql
1− δ .
This is the transfer an αh-type buyer will get in period 0 in our solution, and the
expected utility starting from period 1 will be 0 by construction. Similarly, we can
find the expected utility of an αl-type buyer who reports αh:
(α1h − α1l )(θ1h − θ1l )(ql − θ1l )
1− δ < 0.
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Therefore, the lower type wouldn’t report αh, so he gets a continuation utility
of 0. Because we have found a solution satisfying the stronger collection of com-
patibility conditions in S , it is the correct solution for the set of ICCs.
4 Discussion
Reintroducing the time indices for parameters that were dropped in the deriva-
tions, in Proposition 3.1:
qtl = θ
t
l − (θth − θtl )
ϕ
1− ϕ ·
αth − αtl
1− αtl
.
It can be seen intuitively that the distortion of θl allocations at all points in time is
induced by the need to decrease rents for the high type buyer. A marginal increase
∆q in all allocations for a θtl report of the low type buyer, at any period, would lead
to a proportional increase in rents ϕ(αth − αtl)(θth − θtl )∆q and the extra revenue for
the seller (1− ϕ)(1− αtl)(θtl − qtl)∆q in that period, in the first order approximation.
At equilibrium, the two must be equal, and this gives the result.
Varying the different parameters gives us results that coincide with those of
simpler problems. If ϕ = 0, then there is only one buyer type, who must sign
a contract before he knows his first θ. As expected, our solution becomes qtl =
θtl ,q
t
h = θ
t
h, which is the classical dynamic contract when the buyer has no private
information. Substituting in the prices determined in Proposition 3.1, it is readily
seen that
αtl p
t
h + (1− αtl)ptl = αtl
θt2h
2
+ (1− αtl)
θt2l
2
, (5)
pth − ptl =
θt2h
2
−
(
θthθ
t
l −
θt2l
2
)
. (6)
With no private information, the buyer is allocated the first best, and pays an ex-
pected price equal to the expected value of the allocation. The difference in the
prices for the two allocations reflects the information rent – the potential gain from
lying about the utility type.
As ϕ approaches 1, qtl becomes 0 when condition (iii) in Lemma 3.5 binds. From
Proposition 3.2, the low buyer type is allocated qtl = 0 after low utility reports, and
the high buyer type receives reduced allocations q′tl after low reports. The rent
becomes 0 for the high buyer type because he cannot gain anymore from misrep-
resenting α. In effect, the high type buyer is so dominant that the other type is
distorted to the limit, and the high type is treated as in the classic problem with
only one type and no private information.
When αth = α
t
l , in the limit the solution is the first best because the buyer has
no relevant private information that is not known at the moment of contracting.
In this case, the buyer types are not distinctive anymore, a situation equivalent to
equivalent to ϕ = 0.
23
The dynamics in this multi-period model are the result of the time variation of
the parameters {θtl,h} and {αtl,h}, which are common knowledge. Since both the
two utility types and their distribution are allowed to change over time, alloca-
tions can vary as well. However, the same expression derives the allocations in
each period after the first. Keeping in mind that the allocation distortions have the
purpose to elicit truthful reporting of private information, such private informa-
tion is revealed through the buyer type initially and then through the utility type
every subsequent period. The expression for the allocation distortions is common
because the same type of private information in revealed. In other words, there is
no reason to distort nth period allocations differently from (n + 1)th period allo-
cations – everything else being equal. This reasoning holds only if the true buyer
type is elicited at onset; otherwise each period’s utility type report would lead to
an updated prior for the buyer type as well.
It is instructive to contrast the dynamic evolution of allocations with that in
Battaglini [2005]. The difference is in the informativeness of the private informa-
tion the agent has when the contract is signed. When the type follows a Markov
process, the initial type report has an exponentially decreasing correlation to the
future type; hence, the distortions decrease over time and the contract converges
to the contract that would be offered to a buyer with no private information (i.e.,
no distortions, and rents are extracted ex ante.) In the current setting, the initial
buyer type report is relevant for all subsequent type reports, so the distortions are
consistent over time. One can see the current setting as repeating a one period
game infinitely many times, with utilities and payments discounted. Since the
only connection between periods comes from the buyer type, which is reported in
the truthful mechanism, the optimal allocations in all future periods – so also the
distortions from the first best –, have to be similarly derived. When types are given
by a Markov process, the slow reduction in future allocation distortions takes into
account the progressively weaker impact of the initial private information, which
is the result of the geometrically decreasing correlation between types over time.
The form of the allocation distortions at all time periods is induced by the trade-off
between information rent and profit, so it is related to the impact of the private in-
formation that the buyer or agent has at the moment when the contract is signed.11
In future work, a straightforward but involved extension is solving for an ar-
bitrary finite number of buyer types. The equivalents of Lemmas 3.1 – 3.4 can be
stated for every pair of adjacent types, and then Lemma 3.5 must be reformulated
for a marginally distorted type – equivalent in our case to the αl type. To simplify
and reduce compatibility constraints further, a new condition on the distribution
of types is required to make sure that only incentive constraints between adjacent
types are relevant. This condition would become, in the limit of continuous types,
proportional to the inverse hazard rate. A conjecture is that for {αi}Ii=1 there are
two indices 1 ≤ x < y ≤ I s.t. for the αj buyer type with x ≤ j ≤ y, the low utility
allocation is reduced, but not entirely eliminated, and the reduction is now propor-
11If the buyer has no relevant private information about a future period at the moment of signing
the contract, the principal can always ask for the expected information rent as a fee.
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tional to the probability fraction of all the types i > j over the probability of type
αj, so ∑Ij+1λαi /λαj . For αi, i < x, the low utility allocation is 0, while for αi, i > y,
the low utility allocation is efficient. This also hints at the solution in the contin-
uous limit, where αx, αy would have to be the bounds of a subinterval of types
where low utility allocations are distorted. Lower types would then receive 0 at
low utility, and higher types receive the first best. The continuous limit of the ratio
of probabilities is then the inverse hazard rate, divided by a scale factor.12
5 Conclusion
This paper analyses finite and infinite time contracts between a principal and an
agent, specifically focusing on set-ups in which the agent types and their utility
types are discrete, and when the agent has private information on the probability
of his future utility types. In general, the number of compatibility conditions that
need to be considered is very large, but the solution can be searched in a wider
space bounded by fewer or weaker constraints, and confirmed with a stronger set
of constraints. The paper proposes a way to construct these weaker and stronger
constraints. First look for direct truthful mechanisms that incentivize a buyer who
has reported his type truthfully to also report his utility type truthfully, after any
history of reports. Then, verify that the mechanism implies that all types will re-
spond truthfully, regardless of history.
The method can be applied when the agent has private information that is not
completely random nor fixed, but comes from a type dependent distribution which
is his private information. In an example with two discrete types each period, the
optimal contract for two types of buyers with two types of utilities has some of
the usual properties found in the static problem, like no allocation distortions for
the high type. There are consistent distortions for the low type buyer when he
reports low utility, and the distortions decrease social welfare. The permanence
of distortions reflects the persistent value of the initial private information. The
results provide some insight into the pricing strategies of monopolistic suppliers
of firms, franchises, or sellers that have repeated interactions with their customers.
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